日本はアメリカの属国だ太田述正コミュのコラム#1830の補足

　ニューヨークタイムスも、コラム#1830で紹介したウェイントローブらの本の書評を載せました。
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/books/review/05besc.html?pagewanted=print
（８月５日アクセス）
　
　その中に、マーシャルについては、
・・in 1938, Roosevelt tried to pressure Marshall, then the Army’s deputy chief of staff, into consenting to a delay in the development of large ground forces until seven airplane factories could be built.
As a dozen officials’ bobbleheads went up and down, Roosevelt asked Marshall, “Don’t you think so, George?” Marshall resented Roosevelt’s “misrepresentation of our intimacy.” He said, “I am sorry, Mr. President, but I don’t agree with that at all.” As Marshall later recalled, Roosevelt “gave me a startled look, and when I went out they all bade me goodbye and said that my tour in Washington was over.”
It wasn’t. Roosevelt was not used to such frank disagreement in large meetings, but he admired Marshall’s grit and conviction and soon promoted him.

アイゼンハワーについては、
A lifelong Army man, Eisenhower had watched Marshall and MacArthur during their differences with Roosevelt and Truman. When he entered the White House in 1953, he was probably better schooled to know both the importance and the limits of military advice than any other president of his century.
Though the story does not appear in either book, in the late 1950s, Eisenhower’s generals - especially in the Air Force - were clamoring for a huge increase in the defense budget. The Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, was declaring that his country was cranking out planes and nuclear missiles “like sausages” and would soon overtake the United States.
Knowing from secret intelligence that Khrushchev’s claims were a fraud, Eisenhower held down military spending. His fortitude opened him to charges from Senator John F. Kennedy and other politicians that he was tolerating a “missile gap” and leaving America undefended. But his decision probably meant the country was able to avoid the ruinous inflation that afflicted its economy in later years.

というくだりが出てきます。
　やはりこの２人に比べるとマッカーサーは一段劣る、ということのようです。
　
　もっとも、やたら格好良いマーシャルも、『マオ』の張戎らにかかると、支那情勢が全く分からないでくの坊ということになってしまうのが面白いところです。

　トルーマンは、1945年12月に陸軍参謀長のマーシャルを支那に送り込み、国共内戦回避に当たらせますが、1947年１月まで現地に滞在しつつ、当時の中国共産党がソ連の傀儡であることも、毛という人物についても把握できず、従っていくら腐敗しきっていたとはいえ、中国国民党の方がまだマシであることもついに自覚せず、内戦が始まると共産党軍の方を支援した挙げ句、毛と中国共産党に好意を抱いたまま帰国して国務長官に任命されるのです。（『マオ』PP287〜289）

　とはいえ、これはマーシャル一人の罪ではなく、当時の米国がいかに国際情勢音痴であったかを示すものでしょう。
　こんな米国のために東アジア全体がどれほどの災厄を被ったか、米国人に骨の髄まで分からせる必要があります。