For, as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign; so, that every thought is an external sign, proves that man is an external sign. That is to say, the man and the external sign are identical, in the same sense in which the words homo and man are identical. Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the thought.
そしてこの整合性とは、事物の知的性質、言い換れば、ある事物が他の事物を表示するという性質に他ならないのである」(167頁)。
It is hard for man to understand this, because he persists in identifying himself with his will, his power over the animal organism, with brute force. Now the organism is only an instrument of thought. But the identity of a man consists in the consistency of what he does and thinks, and consistency is the intellectual character of a thing; that is, is its expressing something.
そして誰でもその事物について充分な経験をもち、またそれについて充分に考えを練るならば、ひとつの真なる結論に到達するだろう』」(70頁〜71頁)。
Our external permanency would not be external, in our sense, if it was restricted in its influence to one individual.
It must be something which affects, or might affect, every man. And, though these affections are necessarily as various as are individual conditions, yet the method must be such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same.
Such is the method of science.
Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this:
There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them;
those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are;
and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion.
「ある実在物があるということを、お前はどうして知るのかと問われるかもしれないが、『ある実在物がある』という仮説が私の探究の方法の唯一の支えである限り、この方法をその仮説の支えに用いることはできない」。
It may be asked how I know that there are any Reals. If this hypothesis is the sole support of my method of inquiry, my method of inquiry must not be used to support my hypothesis.
「ある対象の概念を明断に捉えようとするならば、その対象がどんな効果を、しかも行動と関係があるかもしれないと考えられるような効果を及ぼすと考えられるか、ということをよく考察してみよ。そうすればこうした効果についての概念は、その対象についての概念と一致する」(「概念を明晰にする方法」89頁)
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
「『葡萄酒』という概念で、私たちの感覚に直接もしくは間接に特定の影響を及ぼすものだけを意味するのであって、あるものが葡萄酒の感知しうる特徴をすべてもっていながら、しかも本当は血であるなどというのは、無意味な戯言である」(88頁)。
and we can consequently mean nothing by wine but what has certain effects, direct or indirect, upon our senses; and to talk of something as having all the sensible characters of wine, yet being in reality blood, is senseless jargon.
「虚構というものは誰かの想像の産物であり、その人の思考によって刻みつけられた特徴をもっている。ところがこうした特徴が、きみたちや私がどう考えるかということに依存しないというのが、外的な実在というものである」(「概念を明晰にする方法95頁)。
A figment is a product of somebody's imagination; it has such characters as his thought impresses upon it. That those characters are independent of how you or I think is an external reality.
「すべての研究者が結局は賛成することが予め定められている見解こそ、私たちが『真理』という言葉で意味しているものであり、こうした見解によって表現されている対象こそ『実在』に他ならない。これが『実在』という概念を説明する私の方式である」(同上、99頁)。
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality.
「一方では、実在は必ずしも思考一般に依存しないわけでなく、ただ実在をあなたとか私とかあるいは有限な数の人間が何と考えるかということに依存しないだけであり、他方では、究極の見解の対象はその見解がどうであるかということには依存するけれども、その見解がどうであるかということは、あなたとか私がそれをどう考えるかということには依存しない」(承前)。
But the answer to this is that, on the one hand, reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it; and that, on the other hand, though the object of the final opinion depends on what that opinion is, yet what that opinion is does not depend on what you or I or any man thinks.
「こうして実在的なものとは、知識や推論が遅かれ早かれ最終的に落ち着く先であり、私やあなたのきまぐれに支配されないようなものである。実在概念のこのような成立事情からして、実在概念がコミュニティの概念を含んでいることは明らかである。そしてこのコミュニティは新しい知識を受け入れるということに関しては大いに開放的なのである」(「人間記号論の試み」163頁)。
The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge.
「不完全な推論とは、前提の中に含まれていない事実にその推論の正しさが依存するような推論である」(「人間記号論の試み」132頁)。
An incomplete inference is one whose validity depends upon some matter of fact not contained in the premisses.
こうして私たちは、ものを考えるとき、私たち自身がひとつの記号として現われるのだということが出来よう」(141頁)。
The third principle whose consequences we have to deduce is, that, whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a sign.
But it follows from our own existence (which is proved by the occurrence of ignorance and error) that everything which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves.
This does not prevent its being a phenomenon of something without us, just as a rainbow is at once a manifestation both of the sun and of the rain.
When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign.
「こうして記号と見なされた記号はすべて、後続する思考の中で説明され解釈されるという法則には、死によってすべての思考が突然の終局を迎えるということがない限り、一つの例外も見出せないのである」(143頁)。
But if a train of thought ceases by gradually dying out, it freely follows its own law of association as long as it lasts, and there is no moment at which there is a thought belonging to this series, subsequently to which there is not a thought which interprets or repeats it.