ウィスパリング同時通訳研究会コミュのPM Lee Hsien Loong's Dialogue with the Council on Foreign Relations 30 March 2022.

Dr. Richard Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations: I want to begin with the joint statement that was issued on the occasion of your meeting with President Biden earlier this week. I want to quote one line in particular, “The war in Ukraine has a negative impact on the Indo-Pacific region.” And just to begin, I would love to hear your explanation as to why that is so, and how? What specifically are you alluding to there?

PM Lee Hsien Loong: It impacts the Asia Pacific area at many levels. First of all, it damaged the international framework for law and order, and peace between countries. It violates the UN Charter, it endangers the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, especially small ones. And if a principle is accepted, that crazy decisions and historical errors are the justification for invading somebody else, I think many of us are going to be feeling very insecure in the Asia Pacific, but also in the rest of the world.
Secondly, because of what has happened and the rend in relations in Europe, between developed countries, and Russia, the global system of multilateral working together —whether on trade, climate change, pandemic preparedness, nuclear non-proliferation—has become very difficult to work. You no longer have a framework in which opponents, rivals, competitors, work together and maybe disagree with one another, but there is a way in which we can do win-win cooperation.
Now it is win-lose, you want the other guy to be down, fix him, crash his economy. So how then do most of the countries, if possible, hang together and cooperate with one another and not fall into disorder, autarky or anarchy? That is a big worry for us in Singapore because we depend on globalisation to make a living.
Thirdly, what happens in Ukraine is bound to have a big impact on US - China relations. It will strain them; it has already strained them. You hope that with contacts between President Biden and President Xi at the highest level, rational calculations will be made, and the relations will hold. In other words, not become worse than they already are. But you do not know. Despite the best efforts on both sides, and if relations between the US and China worsen, that has a bigger implication for the whole of Asia Pacific and the world.
Then there are the countries’ specific responses towards what is going to happen in Ukraine.Every country is now going to ask what lesson does this hold for me? In terms of my defence, in terms of who can I trust to come to my help when I need it? And you can see particularly in Northeast Asia. Mr Abe in Japan (is) saying we should think about hosting US’ nuclear weapons. And I am sure that some Japanese involved in strategic issues have been thinking these thoughts before. But now Mr Abe has put it on the table. The government of course has said no, we will never do that. But the thought is planted, and it will not go away because the implication from Ukraine is that nuclear deterrence is something which can be very valuable.
I think South Korea also. If you read the opinion polls, (it) has a majority of the population who believe that the country should develop some kind of nuclear capability, not just host American weapons, which it used to do, but some kind of its own nuclear capability. So, if it goes in that direction, if you are an optimist, you will say now, North Korea has it, South Korea has it, Japan has it, PRC has it, and we have a stable equilibrium. And if Iran has it and Turkey and Saudi Arabia and some other Middle Eastern countries, you have an even bigger equilibrium. You hope it is still stable, but I think we are heading into very dangerous directions.
Then, in terms of who is going to come to your help, I think calculations are going to be made. The framework in Asia Pacific is different from the framework in Europe. In Europe, you have got NATO; you have got Article Five; you have got former Warsaw Pact countries, the former Soviet Union republics. And so, the context as to where the lines are drawn, where the red lines are, is different. In Asia, you do not have that. But you have Taiwan; you have a One China policy; you have a Taiwan Relations Act on the US side. But between the US and China, you have Three Joint Communiques. What does this mean for how these structures will be interpreted; how things move?
I think if we look at what is happening in Taiwan, in terms of their own defences, they are now talking about pushing their draft National Service from four months to 12 months. I do not think it is going to happen, because it is not so easy just to call up everybody for that much longer, but at least that is the public mood at the moment. And there was a poll on Taiwanese opinion as to whether they have confidence, which country will come to the help should the situation arise. And it is now at the point where there is 40 per cent (who) believe that the Japanese will come to their help, and 30 per cent or one-third who think that the Americans will come to their help. And in October last year, it was two-thirds believing that the Americans would come to their help.
So, I think these calculations will be made, they will not change the scene overnight. But all these are significant strategic recalibrations. I think beyond the response to the immediate situation in Ukraine, we should also think in Asia Pacific about the path into conflict and how it can be avoided. What structures can you build; what processes; what engagements; what strategic accommodations can be made, in order to head off such a failure of deterrence and then you are into a defence situation.
In Europe, there is a big debate, amongst academics anyway, between the realist like John Mearsheimer who says if NATO had not expanded into Eastern Europe, this would not have happened and those who said, well, this would have happened anyway, just as well, you have now got Poland and the Baltics inside NATO. In Asia, you do not have NATO. But we do have hotspots; we do have issues which are difficult to resolve, and we do need institutions which will bring in countries on both sides – rivals, and engage the US, engage China, engage countries which are closer to one or the other, and enable an adjustment which is very difficult to make – which is how to accommodate China, which is going to become more developed, larger, more advanced in the technology, and yet not become overbearing on the rest of the world and acceptable to the US, which currently, is the dominant military power worldwide.
And you have got to move in that direction. We have APEC, it is very helpful. It is focused on economic issues. We have the East Asia Summit which brings all the participants in and talks about strategic issues, but it does not go a lot beyond that into substantive implementation. And now the US talks about the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework as a way to engage the region and not just on strategic or security and potentially hostile basis, but on a win-win basis. I think you need to have given thought to this and steer things in a direction which does not lead you to a hot conflict.

Haass: You have put a lot on the table, Sir. Thank you. By the way, in the room here, I see a lot of my former colleagues, we have all been involved one way or another in writing, or signing off on joint statements. This one is worth looking at. There is a little bit more substance to this than say, many of the joint statements I was associated with. I won't speak for several of you, but I do recommend it. Every once in a while, government delivers and this was one of those times.
You said something I was going to raise but I want to follow up on it, which is regional views of the United States. So my question is, in this crisis, the United States has provided what I would describe as indirect support for Ukraine, significant military help, diplomatic help, intelligence help, obviously the economic sanctions, and the rest, but not direct military support, either it has rejected the “no fly zone idea”, boots on the ground. So that is one data point. This administration is very different than its predecessor in important ways. So, when people look at what the United States is right now, look at what it is doing and not doing in Taiwan (and) Ukraine. Does this increase confidence that the US is there? Because you essentially are suggesting maybe not.

PM Lee: I think the situations are different. As I said in Europe, you have got NATO and you know where you draw the line on NATO. And in Asia, you do not have NATO, you have the Three Joint Communiques, and you also have a policy of strategic ambiguity on what you do in Taiwan.
I think what we will all like to see happen in Taiwan is that the status quo continues, and changes – if there are any changes – they must not take place, forcibly or non-peacefully. That is very difficult to manage because it is not just (an) economic issue, it is not just a strategic issue, but also to do with the politics and the sentiments of the population. And so, it is something which you can only manage over a long period of time.

Haass: Is there though a concern that because of the re-emergence of what you might call a significant Russian threat to European order, that plans for the pivot to Asia will not materialise and instead, the United States is almost going to require a detour on the way to its pivot to Asia to pivot back to Europe?

PM Lee: Well, America has always had worldwide preoccupations. I mean, if it had not been Ukraine, it would have been Iran or something else would have come up somewhere else in the world. Latin America from time to time preoccupies you too. So, I think we accept that you have worldwide far-flung interests, but the Asia Pacific is one of those areas where you not only have China, whose relationship you must manage, but also so many other partners of the United States, some of them your allies. Others of them, your friends. Many of them with very substantial economic ties to the United States. You’ve developed this relationship and these interests, and this region of relative stability and peace in the world for nearly 80 years since the war. So whatever your other far-flung interests, this is something which you cannot walk away from. And I think the US Presidents understand this, and they all have given personal attention to this, but I cannot see them focusing on this to the exclusion of everything else. Neither do I think they are very likely to neglect their relationship with China because they are preoccupied elsewhere. What we do worry is while dealing with China, whether there is also bandwidth and appetite and possibility to develop relations with Southeast Asia and other countries in the region.

Haass: Let us talk about China for a second. Several people – I will admit, I am one of them – put forth the argument that this has been a sobering experience for China. The fact that the sanctions introduced by the United States and its partners, including your country, have been wide and deep, really unprecedented. And China is much more of an investing and trading company than Russia, so potentially vulnerable. Plus, all this was done mounting an indirect defence of Ukraine and as you said, our position of strategic ambiguity in no way rules out a direct defence of Taiwan.
So, sitting in Beijing, do you get the sense that the Chinese have been somewhat sobered by this, and that they indeed paid something of a political price in the region and beyond, for so closely associating themselves with a war that is truly identified with one individual and has been carried out in an extraordinarily brutal way?

PM Lee: I think it presents them with awkward questions. Because on Ukraine, it violates the principles which the Chinese hold very dearly – territorial integrity, and sovereignty and non-interference. And if you can do that to Ukraine, and if the Donbas can be considered to be enclaves, and maybe republics…

Haass: What about Taiwan?
PM Lee: Or other parts of non-Han China? So, that is a very difficult question. Also, looking at the sanctions, it shows how interrelated we all are. Because if we do business with one another, we all have accounts with one another, and any one of us – especially the bigger ones – can pull their house down. I may own a lot of US Treasuries, but if the US decides to freeze those accounts, well, that has practical economic consequences. So, we are all dependent on one another. I would put it conversely too – if you cut off China, and say “well, I will do without that”, you do not have accounts in Chinese banks on the same scale, but your economic interdependence, they are one of your biggest trading partners – it is a manufacturing base for many of the US companies. If those links fracture, it is going to hurt you too. It does not mean that you will not end up in a bad spot, but it does mean that I think both sides know the price is very high.
One more thing: I do not think that in the region, the fact that China refuses to distance itself from Russia, costs it. All the countries in the region — they worry about sovereignty and the principles of the UN charter – but at the same time, they want their ties with China and quite a few of them have significant ties with Russia, for example, India. So, the fact that the Chinese have taken their own position and they consider you a supplicant, asking them to help solve the Russian problem and they are saying, well, to untie the bell you need the person who tied the bell. In other words, solve your own problem.

Haass: We noticed that. You mentioned the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Two questions associated with that: What is your sense of what it should do? It has been articulated, but not really fleshed out. And to what extent can or will it be seen as an alternative for US participation in the CPTPP? Is this in any way seen as a substitute, or is this seen as at best a distant second best?
What could, or will the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework prove to be?

PM Lee: What it should do is to be a positive agenda for the US on economic cooperation with countries in Asia Pacific. An agenda which is inclusive, agenda which is forward looking, and an agenda which has something in it of an upside for both parties. Ideally, you have the TPP. That is water under the bridge.

Haass: Carla Hills is shaking her head.
PM Lee: That is water under the bridge, it has become the CPTPP, which means that you are not in it. But now the Chinese have applied to join, and what are you going to do? What are we going to do? “We”, meaning the members of the CPTPP will have to reach some consensus as to how to handle this application. Taiwan has also applied by the way, and what is the US going to respond? By way of demonstrating that it is engaged in the region.
Ideally, the US would respond with a trade liberalisation market access type, move to develop links with a region. You can't rejoin, well, some other scheme, but I think even some other scheme would be too difficult in the present political climate. What the US has come up with is the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.
It is not what all the things which you need to do, but if you can do these things, they are positive items. I would say you could make this as substantive as possible. So short of having FTA elements, market access, at least imagine having some digital economy cooperation, or green sustainable economy cooperation.
Let us take some baby steps towards market access and trade liberalisation. Short of needing to get TPA from the Congress or needing to ratify something, begin to move there and hope that as over the next few American elections, the mood changes and it becomes more rather than less feasible, then you have a path forward. Meanwhile, well, politics is the art of the possible.

Haass: As we say in another part of the world, to what you just said, Inshallah. If you ask people, if you had word association, and you said “globalisation”, country associated with globalisation, Singapore…

PM Lee: We are top of the list.
Haass: Exactly. But right now, the word that increasingly is being bandied about is deglobalisation, because of sanctions, because of constraints and freezing central bank assets, because of supply chains, because of COVID, US-China frictions. What is your sense of how this balance between globalization and deglobalization is going, and what concerns you here?
PM Lee: To us ideally, we are all in one flat world. Tom Friedman used to write books like that. But it is not one flat world. There are not only hills and valleys, but deep chasms which you cannot easily cross and some of which have been deepened. We have to make a living trying to belong to the biggest, flattest and safest part of that world.
I cannot see countries going back, each on doing completely their own thing. You cannot make an iPhone totally in America, any more than you can make a Boeing aeroplane completely in America.
You do need international trade. You do need commerce. You need to have processes to make sure you trust your partners and that you can rely on one another and there is redundancy in case the lines fail. But international inter-dependence and economic co-operation, will have to continue the challenges.
How do I talk about reshoring and rebuilding US manufacturing and all these good things, without it being captured and going overboard and becoming another name for protecting non-viable economic activities, impoverishing your own workers, including the middle class, and that is your challenge.
To us, the question is in this world, what can we do to make sure that we are part of trusted supply chains that we can continue to work with you and to maintain that relationship, and you can continue to trust us and we can do business together - not just two of us, but that there is an inkblot which is big enough so that many countries in the world can co-operate and where you have countries which are beyond the border, some kind of filter, so that you do not completely shut them out.
Because I think if you say you are going to shut out the Chinese completely, you will not kill them, but you are going to hurt yourself considerably.

Haass: I agree with that. I prefer the word distancing at times - selective distancing to decoupling. One of the piece of the joint statement I wanted to refer to – and we will open it up to questions in a minute then – when it came to North Korea, there was rather familiar language, there was the call for complete denuclearisation and permanent peace. Now I am as optimistic as the next guy. But I would think the odds of complete denuclearisation and permanent peace on the peninsula are something less than high.
So, what is your realistic agenda? Short of that, even if that's a long term goal, what is your realistic near and medium term goal with North Korea?
PM Lee: I think this is on the record, and I do not think any politician on the record would acknowledge that North Korea is entitled to nuclear weapons. I think what is conceivable to happen is that there is deterrence and there is a situation where the status quo does exist, but countries continue to not recognise it. Because if you do recognise it, then there are many consequences. And everybody else will straightaway say, well, if he is entitled to and recognised what about me? Why am I standing around? If he is not entitled to, he has it one day, the situation may well be put right, may possibly be put right. Well, perhaps there is some possibility to slow down proliferation and much, much wider spread. Maybe.