Ned Price: (00:01)Good afternoon.
Matt: (00:03)Good afternoon.
Ned Price: (00:09)I expect you all have seen the statement from the president, the statement from Secretary Blinken, the statement from the Department of the Treasury regarding our latest action to hold to account the Cuban regime for its abuses in the aftermath of the peaceful protests in Cuba. And so with that, I have nothing, but my eagerness and happiness to take your questions.
Matt: (00:35)Eagerness?
Ned Price: (00:35)Eagerness, I’m always eager, Matt.
Matt: (00:37)Okay, well, let’s start with Cuba then.
Ned Price: (00:39)Okay.
Matt: (00:42)You designated one person and an entity that was already covered by Global Magnitsky Sanctions that were imposed by the Trump administration in January. So I don’t understand why you think that this is such a big deal.
Ned Price: (01:02)Well, Matt, let me first give you a bit of context to make sure this is understood in the right light. As we have said, since the onset of the peaceful protests across the island of Cuba, we will stand with the Cuban people who are exercising their universal rights of a peaceful protest, peaceful assembly, freedom of speech. We will look at additional ways we can support them. We have spoken to the formation of a remittance working group. We have spoken about the ways in which we are seeking to expand internet access so that the Cuban people can practice that freedom of expression and have the free flow of information to which they are entitled. We have spoken to our review of how we might augment our staffing at our embassy in Havana. But we have also said that we are going to hold to account those Cuban individuals and entities responsible for the crackdown on this peaceful protest.
(02:13)
And I said yesterday that the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is exploring designating Cuban officials, Cuban entities, responsible for violence, repression, human rights violations against those who are perpetrating this in Cuba. So you are right. We designated through the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regime one individual and one entity today. This I do not expect will be the sum total of our actions. We’re going to continue to review what more we can do, not only to support the Cuban people, but also again, importantly, to hold to account those who would be so brazen in their efforts and attempts to violate the human rights of the Cuban people.
Matt: (03:00)Okay. But I mean, the Special Brigade of the Interior Ministry was already covered by Global Magnitsky Sanctions. So you’ve added another designation. The impact of this seems to me, whatever the impact would have been, it seems to be negligible since they were already covered. So I don’t quite understand how it is that you’re presenting this as some grand new initiative to support the Cuban people. When, in fact, it’s simply adding another layer, which was really unnecessary since they already were covered by the sanction.
Ned Price: (03:44)I would make a couple points. Number one, the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regime is an important tool we have that is applicable-
Matt: (03:51)It is, but they were already under it.
Ned Price: (03:55)Álvaro López Miera was-
Matt: (03:55)No. I’m talking about that… That’s one person, okay? Who most likely doesn’t have any assets [crosstalk 00:04:03] or any dealings with American citizens. So let’s talk about what the real impact would be if you designated a whole entity of part of the Interior Ministry, like with the Iran sanctions, okay? That would have a much bigger impact, whatever that impact would be. But the fact of the matter is that they were already covered by Global Magnitsky Sanctions. The exact same sanction, the exact same executive order was used to do this, and it doesn’t do anything new.
Ned Price: (04:32)Just so we’re not having a conversation just with each other. Let me just level set with everyone.
Matt: (04:38)Well, I’ll be done. I’m done after that.
Ned Price: (04:38)Well, as Matt alluded to, we have imposed sanctions on the minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba, Álvaro López Miera, as well as the Ministry of the Interior Special National Brigade. This individual, this entity, we have targeted them as part of our effort that is not over, to be sure, to hold to account those actors in Cuba who have been responsible for the crackdown, for the oppression, for the human rights abuses on those in Cuba, who are doing nothing more than exercising their universal rights.(05:19)
Now, we obviously do have a well developed sanctions regime in place that covers different elements and entities in Cuba. That said, the embargo and the other sanctions tools, they do have carve-outs. They have carve-outs for a number of reasons. It is absolutely true that by sanctioning this individual and this entity, some of those carve-outs are closed, that there will be repercussions and implications for this individual and this entity. And it’s important, an important signal of our determination to hold accountable those responsible for this. Tracy?
Tracy: (06:07)Specifically, what carve-outs are closed in that case? What are they not going to get that they were getting before? Just to follow up on Matt’s question, what’s the practical impact of this? Or is it largely symbolic?
Ned Price: (06:21)Well, there is an important messaging elements to this. The Global Magnitsky Regime is a valuable tool we have that, again, is not applicable solely in the context of Cuba, but the world over and we’ve used it to good effect the world over. Now with the Global Magnitsky Regime, there are a number of implications, some of which do apply to this individual and this entity, some of which may not given the rather unique circumstances.
Tracy: (06:58)Like weapons, money, food, I mean?
Ned Price: (06:58)So let me give you a couple examples. And now, obviously, we’re not able to detail specific holdings of entities or individuals, but under this regime, all property and interest in property in any of the entities that are owned directly or indirectly, or with other designated persons that are in the United States or in the possession or control of US persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC, unless authorized otherwise.(07:31)
In addition, these persons and all property and interests in property of these persons are blocked pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. These prohibitions further include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by to or for the benefit of any blocked person or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. So there are a number of implications. Some of this is highly technical, especially given the intersection with the broader sanctions tools we have applied in the context of Cuba, but this is a meaningful and important step. Andrea.
Andrea: (08:15)I want to also ask you about remittances because the president said that he’s looking for ways to get remittances directly to the people, not to the regime, as well as looking at the internet being restored, if there was some technical way that that could be done. On remittances, I interviewed Marco Rubio today and he said it’s just not possible unless the regime changes its policy of requiring that all remittances be deposited in government banks, be converted into pesos, which are useless in terms of any value, even on the island compared to dollars. So he said, there’s no point in trying to do that unless the regime changes its policy.
Ned Price: (08:57)What the president said earlier this week is that the administration would form a remittance working group to study this very issue, namely to identify the most effective way possible, or potentially, to get those remittances directly into the hands of the Cuban people. This is a concern we share. This administration shares this concern with many in Congress that remittances would find their way into Cuban government coffers. This is precisely why we were looking closely at the issue to determine tools, tactics, procedures that might be possible to allow us to push forward with our goals. (09:47)
And that is, in the first instance, supporting the Cuban people, providing them with the much needed humanitarian relief that so clearly they are calling for and desperate for, without buttressing the regime. So this working group was just announced earlier this week. I don’t have any more updates to share at this time, but this concern about funds potentially going into Cuban government coffers, but also this ultimate objective, supporting the Cuban people, supporting their needs, supporting their aspirations, it’s also something we share with members of Congress. And so we’ll continue to work closely with them.
Andrea: (10:33)Has anything been advanced on the internet?
Ned Price: (10:37)Well, this is also something that the president spoke to for the first time, at least in detail, this week. And what we said is that we will work closely with two entities really, the private sector, as well as with Congress, to identify viable options to make the internet more accessible to the Cuban people. This is a goal that’s important in its own right. Freedom of expression, the ability of people anywhere and everywhere to freely communicate is something the United States always stands for always supports, but it’s especially important now because the Cuban regime, we have seen in recent days, has enacted these blackouts, these internet shutdowns, precisely in an effort to stifle the protest, to silence the Cuban people.(11:33)
And, of course, this does nothing to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Cuban people. This is a sign of a government that in some ways is scared of its own people. And so it’s especially important to us given the actions that the regime has undertaken in recent days to explore again with Congress and the private sector ways we can support the ability of the Cuban people to do what people the world over are entitled to do, exercise their freedom of expression, to share ideas without these sort of technical impediments. Yes.
Speaker 1: (12:17)On the remittances, are you saying we will find a way to allow remittances and to get this money in the Cuban hands? Or are you still saying that there is a chance that this won’t work and there is no way to make that the money doesn’t go into the regime coffers? And also on the embassy staffing, do you have any timing, any dates for when it will happen? Will it happen in the next days or weeks or month?
Ned Price: (12:48)Well, on your first question, we’re forming a working group precisely to find out. We know that the underlying goal is something that certainly has the support of this administration. It has the support of other key stakeholders, including Congress, including many Americans, including Cuban Americans. And that is the objective of supporting the Cuban people, supporting their needs, also helping them to achieve their broader aspirations. (13:16)
We’re studying it because, again, we want to make sure or we want to test the proposition, I should say, that this is something we can do consistent with a countervailing priority. And that is to ensure that we don’t do anything that buttresses or strengthens the regime. So we’re taking a close look at the issue. Again, the working group was just announced this week. Soon as we have more details to share, we will.(13:42)
Similarly, with our staffing plan for the embassy, that plan was just announced this week. We’re taking a close look at a couple of things, what our needs are and what we can do with additional resources and additional people from our embassy in Havana, but also taking a close look at a number of factors, including the safety and security of people who may be going to Havana, some people who may be returning to Havana. That’s obviously a top priority for us around the world. It’s, as we talked about in this room the other day, certainly something we’re taking a close look at it in the context of Cuba, given one of the reasons for our draw down in the first place. So as soon as we have-
Speaker 1: (14:27)[crosstalk 00:14:27] matter of weeks or a month?
Ned Price: (14:28)I wouldn’t want to put a timeframe on it. Obviously, our ability to engage directly with the Cuban people, to support the Cuban people, to hear directly from them, to engage in consular activity, it’s a priority for us. We’re working as fast as we can, but we’re also doing it consistent with the other priorities I laid out.
Speaker 1: (14:53)[inaudible 00:14:53] visa to Cuban people is one of the goals?
Ned Price: (14:56)I’m sorry?
Speaker 1: (15:00)To deliver visas to Cuban people is one of the goals?
Ned Price: (15:01)We are looking at a number of ways we might be able to support the Cuban people and to hold the regime to account. We’ve spoken to several of them, including the new designations today. But I wouldn’t want to get ahead of that. Yes?
Speaker 2: (15:14)[inaudible 00:15:14]?
Ned Price: (15:14)Sure.
Speaker 3: (15:18)The agreement that you released yesterday has had a lot of response on the Hill, both sides of the aisle. People from both parties are pretty upset with the way this has been done. And I think, obviously, one of the key points is sanctions, which Congress has passed laws to make an administration impose over this pipeline. It’s not mentioned in the joint statement yesterday, but is there an implied agreement that the US will continue to waive the sanctions against Nord Stream 2 and its chief executive? And are you concerned that Congress, if they oppose what you’ve done here, will find some way to force your hand on sanctions.
Ned Price: (16:15)So I want to be very clear on this point. I do want to provide some broader context. But just to be very clear on this point, as you mentioned, there is no explicit agreement. There is no implied agreement that we would take any particular course with our sanctions from here out. We are committed to following the law. We will continue to do that. Nothing that was released yesterday changes that in any way. We will continue to follow the law. Let me spend just a second talking about this decision and the broader context behind it. And in our minds, there were really two options before us, in the context of this issue, and neither was especially good. And that is, in large part, because of the hands we were dealt. But we are confident that the measures we announced yesterday will allow us to see to it, that we are able to meet our ultimate and collective goal. (17:21)
And that is to ensure that Russia can not use energy flows, can not weaponize energy flows against our partners. And of course that includes against Ukraine. And so let me unpack that just a little bit. As we’ve always said, and it bears repeating, this administration is opposed to Nord Stream 2. That was true on January 20th. It is true on July 22nd. It will be true going forward. And we’re opposed to it because we think it’s a bad deal. We think it’s a bad deal for Germany. We think it’s a bad deal for our partners, ultimately, because we see it as a potential tool that the Russian Federation could use against our partners. And so that’s why in the six months or so that we’ve been in office, the Biden administration has imposed sanctions on five entities and five vessels under PEZA, as amended, as well as on additional nine vessels within the Nord Stream 2 fleet owned by a sanction entity.
(18:25)
These designations represent sanctions on a significant portion of the Nord Stream 2 fleet. You’ve heard us say this before, but it’s just worth a contextual point. There were two entities related to Nord Stream 2 that were sanctioned before January 20th. There have been 19 applied sense. Those two entities sanctioned by the previous administration, were done in, literally, the final hours of the last administration. So for our part, we will continue to oppose this pipeline. And getting back to your first question, our next sanctions report, it’s due every 90 days, it’s due to Congress next month. And so to be very clear, we are not relinquishing any tools available to us. And in fact, we are adding several more to our arsenal, and I’ll get to that in just a moment. The fact, however, is that by the time we took office, this pipeline was 90% complete. (19:24)
And we came to the conclusion, based on the available information, not all of which is public, that sanctions would not halt the pipeline’s construction. And so, as I said at the outset, we really had two options before us. One, we could undermine our relationship with our ally Germany by imposing sanctions, that again, per our judgment, would not have been effective at a time when we needed our allies and a time when we need our allies like Germany, perhaps more so than ever. Not only would we have jeopardized our relationship with Germany, but Ukraine and our other partners could have been left to fend for themselves. To us, that was unacceptable. It was unacceptable to us that we would leave our partners vulnerable and susceptible to Moscow’s whims. Alternatively, we could use the space for diplomacy that the waivers provided, and we could seek to find a way to achieve that overriding goal. And that is to ensure that Russia could not weaponize Nord Stream 2, could not weaponize Nord Stream 2 against Ukraine, any of our other partners. And that’s nicely what we have been able to do. (20:37)
And you saw that reflected in the package that was announced yesterday. We brought Germany to the table to negotiate these measures, designed to reduce the risk and operational Nord Stream 2 would pose to European energy security, to Ukraine, to other frontline NATO and EU countries. And throughout this process, both we and our German allies, have consulted very closely with Ukraine. We have had more than a dozen consultations with Ukraine in the course of recent weeks. We’ve consulted with Poland, as well as other countries, that would be harmed by this project. As the president likes to say, and I think this is particularly apt in this case, “Don’t compare me to the almighty. Compare me to the alternative.” And this applies here. Do we wish that we weren’t dealt this hand? Of course. Would we like to be able to halt the pipeline’s construction? Of course. You bet. But that wasn’t a realistic option. That wasn’t on the table. And we’re confident that the measures we announced yesterday constitute the best outcome for the circumstances we inherited.
Speaker 3: (21:48)You said the waivers brought Germany to the table. Are you saying that your understanding is that if you remove those waivers, Germany will still feel obliged to do all the things that it promised to in the agreement yesterday?
Ned Price: (22:04)Well, what we were saying is that we’re going to continue to follow the law. The law requires us to submit a report with potentially sanctionable activity. We are going to do that. The law also does have this waiver provision, but the ability to use that is predicated on the national interest. And so we are going to follow that to the T, as we have, and we are going to not waiver from that whatsoever.
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